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A
s the current expansion nears its eighth
anniversary, it becomes tempting to
wonder whether the second-longest
expansion in U.S. economic history is nearing
an end. The only U.S expansion to last longer
was a nearly nine-year expansion that occurred
during the Vietnam War. Thus, the current
expansion is heading into uncharted territory as
the longest peacetime expansion in U.S. his-
tory. The length of the current expansion might
be viewed by some analysts as worrisome.
Thearticleexamineswhethertherehasbeena
systematic shift in the behavior and length of
expansions in the post-World War II period.
Understanding whether there has been such a
shift may help policymakers, businesses, and
consumers evaluate the upside and downside
riskstotheeconomicoutlook.Thearticleargues
thatthelengthofthecurrentexpansiondoesnot
signal a downside risk to the economy. When
viewedinthecontextofallotherpostwarexpan-
sions,thelengthofthecurrentexpansionshould
not be seen as worrisome.
The article is divided into two sections. The
first section examines whether there has been a
shift in U.S. expansion lengths over time and
shows the average length of expansions has
increased dramatically since World War II. In
addition,thesectionalsoshowsthatexpansions
after World War II have not shown a significant
tendency to become more likely to end as they
get older. The second section discusses several
likely factors for this shift in the behavior of
expansions and evaluates whether these factors
continue to be applicable in the current expan-
sion.Inparticular,thesectiondiscusseshowthe
increased role of the government and structural
shifts, such as shifts in the sources of income to
more cyclically stable sectors, in the postwar
U.S.economymayhaveledtoanincreaseinthe
length of expansions.
I. ARE EXPANSIONS GETTING
LONGER?
With the current expansion poised to become
thelongestpeacetimeexpansioninU.S.history,
and with two of the three longest expansions in
U.S. history having occurred since 1980, it is
natural to ask whether there has been a system-
aticshiftinthelengthofexpansions.Inparticu-
lar, one can investigate whether there has been
an increase in the average length of expansions
in the post-World War II period. Arelated issue
thatseveralresearchershaveexaminedhasbeen
whether there is any evidence that expansions
are more likely to end as they get longer and
whether this tendency has changed over time.
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on the banks Website at www.kc.frb.org.This section provides a brief introduction to
businesscyclesandusesthehistoricalrecordof
U.S.businesscyclestoexaminethesetwoissues.
This section provides a brief introduction to
businesscyclesandusesthehistoricalrecordof
U.S.businesscyclestoexaminethesetwoissues.
What are business cycles?
Business cycles are a recurring pattern of
expansion and recession in economic activity
aroundalong-rungrowthpath.
2Thetwophases




activity in each cycle is called the peak and the
lowest point reached by economic activity is
called the trough.
The official business cycle dates for the U.S.
economyaredeterminedbytheNationalBureau
of Economic Research.
4 Officially, the NBER
defines a recession as a recurring period of
decline in total output, income, employment,











by determining whether the economy is indeed
in a new phase. If, for example, the Committee
believestheeconomymayhaveenteredareces-
sion, they use the historical record of business












determining the month in which a turning point
hadbeenreached.Todothistheyexaminemany
monthlyandquarterlyeconomicseriesthathave
been determined to coincide with the business
cycle. The turning points in these individual
seriesarecomparedtoseeiftheycoincide.Since
the turning points in these series often do not
coincideprecisely,theCommitteeusesitsjudg-
ment to choose among these competing dates
andselectthebusinesscycleturningpointdate.
The historical record of U.S.
business cycles
ThedatesdeterminedbytheNBERsBusiness
Cycle Dating Committee to be business cycle
turningpointsareshowninthefirsttwocolumns
of Table 1. The dates of business cycle troughs
are in the first column and the dates of business
cycle peaks are in the second column. Since
1854 there have been 31 recessions and 32
expansions.TheU.S.businesscyclechronology
is often divided into two subsamples, a prewar
subsampleandapostwarsubsample.
7Inthepre-
war period there were 22 recessions and 22
expansions. In the postwar period there have
been 9 recessions and 10 expansions.
The last two columns of Table 1 list the dura-
tion of recessions and expansions since 1854.
The durations of expansions and recessions in
the U.S. historical experience have been quite
varied.Thelastexpansionlistedinthetablehas
not yet been completed but, as of November
1998, has lasted 92 months. The shortest reces-
siononrecordlasted6monthswhilethelongest
recession lasted 65 months. The briefest expan-
sion lasted 10 months while the longest expan-
sion lasted 106 months.
A glance at the historical record suggests a
numberoffeaturesaboutbusinesscyclephases.
First,expansionshavetendedtolastlongerthan
recessions. Second, the duration of business
cyclephasesappearstohavechangedfollowing
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1998 15
Table 1
NBER BUSINESS CYCLE CHRONOLOGY FOR THE U.S.
Dates Duration
Trough Peak Recession Expansion
Dec. 1854 Jun. 1857  30
Dec. 1858 Oct. 1860 18 22
Jun. 1861 Apr. 1865 8 46
Dec. 1867 Jun. 1869 32 18
Dec. 1870 Oct. 1873 18 34
Mar. 1879 Mar. 1882 65 36
May 1885 Mar. 1887 38 22
Apr. 1888 Jul. 1890 13 27
May 1891 Jan. 1893 10 20
Jun. 1894 Dec. 1895 17 18
Jun. 1897 Jun. 1899 18 24
Dec. 1900 Sep. 1902 18 21
Aug. 1904 May 1907 23 33
Jun. 1908 Jan. 1910 13 19
Jan. 1912 Jan. 1913 24 12
Dec. 1914 Aug. 1918 23 44
Mar. 1919 Jan. 1920 7 10
Jul. 1921 May 1923 18 22
Jul. 1924 Oct. 1926 14 27
Nov. 1928 Aug. 1929 13 21
Mar. 1933 May 1937 43 50
Jun. 1938 Feb. 1945 13 80
Oct. 1945 Nov. 1948 8 37
Oct. 1949 Jul. 1953 11 45
May 1954 Aug. 1957 10 39
Apr. 1958 Apr. 1960 8 24
Feb. 1961 Dec. 1969 10 106
Nov. 1970 Nov. 1973 11 36
Mar. 1975 Jan. 1980 16 58
Jul. 1980 Jul. 1981 6 12
Nov. 1982 Jul. 1990 16 92
Mar. 1991 ? 8 92
Note: The current expansion has lasted 92 months as of Nov. 1998.
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research.World War II. Recessions appear to have gotten
shorter and expansions appear to have gotten
longer.
The length of business cycle phases
Theobservationsaboutthelengthofbusiness
cycle phases are presented more formally in
Table2.Thetableshowstheaveragedurationof
completed recessions and expansions in the
wholesampleaswellastheprewarandpostwar
subsamples. These statistics confirm that the
average lengths of both expansions and reces-
sions have changed dramatically in the postwar
period. The average length of expansions has
more than doubled. Expansions, on average
havelasted4.5yearsinthepostwarperiodwhile
prewarexpansionslastedlessthan2.25yearson
average. The average length of recessions has
beenhalvedinthepostwarperiod.Inthepostwar
period recessions, on average, have lasted only
10months,comparedwith20monthsinthepre-
war period.
This change in the average lengths of expan-
sions and recessions has led to a substantial
increase in the amount of time the economy
spends in expansions relative to the time it
spendsinrecessions.While,onaverage,expan-
sionshavelastedtwiceaslongasrecessionsover
the entire sample, the two subsamples tell very
differentstories.PriortotheendofWorldWarII,
expansions lasted only 25 percent longer than
recessions. Since the end of World War II,
expansions have lasted more than five times as
long as recessions.
Do expansions become more likely to end
as they get longer?
The observations that expansions have lasted
longerthanrecessionsandhavegottenlongerin
the postwar period do not offer any insight into
whether an expansion is more likely to end the
longeritgets.Intuitively,weunderstandthatthe
proportion of expansions that reach a given
lengthdeclinesasthegivenlengthincreases.For
example,thebusinesscyclechronologyinTable
1 indicates that 100 percent of all identified
expansionslastedlongerthan8months,while
0 percent lasted longer than 106 months. The
question investigated in this section is subtler
than whether the probability of an expansion
having ended by a specified length increases
with the specified length. This section investi-
gates whether the probability of an expansion
ending at a specified length, given that it has
lasted up to that point, increases with the speci-
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table 2
AVERAGE DURATIONS OF RECESSIONS AND EXPANSIONS
Period Expansion Recession Expansion/Recession
All 35.4 17.7 2.00
Prewar 26.5 21.2 1.25




consists of the 10 expansions and 10 recessions that occurred between 1945 and 1998.fied length. In less formal terms this can be
thought of as investigating whether expansions
die of old age.




provide a statistical framework to model the
conditionalprobabilityofaneventtakingplace.
A conditional probability is the probability of
oneeventoccurringgiventhatanothereventhas
alreadytakenplace.Inthisarticlesanalysis the






lasted through 91 months.




a () tt =
-1,
where t is the length of the observed expansion
and g and a are parameters which will be esti-
mated. The hazard function, l() t , can be inter-
pretedastherateatwhichexpansionswillendat
length t given that they have lasted until t. The
parametergcanbethoughtofasaconstantterm
that is inversely related to the average length of
expansion.Thus,ifallotherthingsarethesame,
larger values for g will imply a shorter average
duration of expansions.
Theparametera determineswhetherthecon-
ditional probability of an expansion ending
increases, decreases, or does not change as the
lengthoftheexpansionincreases.Ifa isgreater
than 1, then the conditional probability of an




nd month given that it has lasted through 91
months is greater than the probability of an
expansion ending in the 22
ndmonth given that it
haslastedthrough21months.Ifa equals1,then
theconditionalprobabilityofanexpansionend-
ing does not change as the length of the expan-
sion increases. Thus, if a equals 1, then the
probability of an expansion ending in the 92
nd
monthgiventhatithaslastedthrough91months
is the same as the probability of an expansion
ending in the 22
nd month given that it has lasted
through 21 months.
The results from estimation of the hazard




excluding the 80-month-long expansion that
occurredduringWorldWarII.
9Thefirstcolumn
of the table presents results from estimating the
hazardmodelusingdataonthewholesampleof
expansions. Although the parameter is esti-
mated to be greater than 1, it is not found to be





Results in the second and third columns of
Table 3 suggest that the behavior of business
cyclesbeforeandafterWorldWarIIisdifferent.
In the prewar period the parameter is estimated
tobesignificantlygreaterthan1,providingevi-
dence that the probability of an expansion end-
ing at a specified length, given that it has lasted
up until that point, increased with the length of
the expansion. In the postwar period, however,
theparameterisnotestimatedtobesignificantly
greater than 1, suggesting that in recent history
theconditionalprobabilityofanexpansionend-
ing has not increased with the length of the
expansion. Thus, postwar expansions do not
seemtodieofoldage.
10Inaddition,AppendixB
shows that this result is not sensitive to alterna-
tive business cycle chronologies.
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changed in the postwar period. The average
length of expansion has increased and expan-
sions no longer become more likely to end as
they get older as they did in the prewar period.
The next section discusses several factors that
might have led to this shift.
II. WHY MIGHT EXPANSIONS BE
GETTING LONGER?
The previous section presented evidence that
thebehaviorofexpansionsshiftedinthepostwar
period. First, the average length of expansions








these factors have had in the postwar period as
well as in the current expansion.
The larger role of government and structural
shifts have largely contributed to a reduction in
thevolatilityofeconomicactivity.
11However,in
an economy that is growing over time a reduc-
tioninthevolatilityofeconomicactivitywould
leadtolongerexpansionsandshorterrecessions.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the volatility of
economic activity and the length of expansions
are related. The top panel of Figure 1 shows a
stylized example of how economic activity
mightfluctuatearoundalong-rungrowthpathin
a low-volatility economy. The top panel of Fig-
ure2showsastylizedexampleofhoweconomic
activity might fluctuate around the same long-
run growth path in a high-volatility economy.
12
The bottom panel in each figure illustrates how
economic activity changes in each of these two
economies. The shaded bars indicate periods of
expansion. The low-volatility economy
depicted in Figure 1 has experienced longer
expansions and shorter recessions than the
high-volatility economy depicted in Figure 2.
Expansions in the low-volatility economy are
longer than expansions in the high-volatility
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Table 3
DOES THE PROBABILITY OF AN EXPANSION ENDING INCREASE AS



















Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is significantly greater
than 1 at the 5 percent level. Calculations are based on the NBER business cycle chronology pre-
sented in Table 1. The entire sample consists of all expansions and recessions between 1854 and
1998 excluding the wartime June 1938-February 1945 expansion. The prewar sample consists of
the 21 expansions and 21 recessions that occurred between 1854 and 1938. The postwar sample
consists of the 10 expansions and 10 recessions that occurred between 1945 and 1998.economy because long-run growth in the econ-
omy dominates smaller fluctuations around the
long-run growth path more than larger fluctua-
tions around the long-run growth path.
Larger role of government
One potential explanation for the shift in the
behavior of expansions during the postwar period
has been the larger role that the government has
playedintheeconomy.Inthepostwarperiodthe
size of the government has increased dramati-
cally, automatic stabilizers have become more
prevalent, many financial reforms have been
enacted, and policy, both fiscal and monetary,
has become more proactive.
Larger government sector. In the postwar
periodthegovernmentsectorhasbeenlargeras






Spending by the government sector is less
affected by fluctuations in economic activity
thanspendinginothersectors.Forexample,fed-
eral government spending on defense is largely
independent of the ups and downs of the busi-
nesscycle.Othercategoriesofspending,suchas
investment spending by businesses, are highly
sensitivetofluctuationsineconomicactivity.As
a result, growth of the government sector rela-
tivetoothersectorsoftheeconomyhashelpedto
moderate swings in economic activity and
extend economic expansions. Government
spending has continued to remain an important
part of overall spending during the current
expansion. Over the 1990-97 period, govern-
ment spending represented 19 percent of total
nominal spending. Thus, government spending
islikelytocontinuetobeastabilizinginfluence
on the economy for the foreseeable future.
Use of automatic stabilizers. The emergence
of automatic stabilizers is perhaps even more
important than the increased size of the govern-
ment sector. Automatic stabilizers are items on
the federal budget that change automatically
when economic activity changes.
14 Automatic
stabilizers are countercyclical. Spending on auto-
matic stabilizers rises as economic activity
declines and falls as economic activity increases.
Two important examples of automatic stabiliz-
ersareunemploymentinsuranceandtheincome
tax system. When the unemployment rate rises,
more people receive unemployment benefits.
This partially offsets the effect of lost income
and helps to cushion a decline in consumer
spending. The income tax system acts in a similar
manner. When the economy goes into a recession,
peoples incomes fall and they pay less income
tax. This reduction in income taxes helps offset
thedeclineinpersonalincomesothatdisposable
income doesnt fall as much and, hence, helps
cushion the decline in consumer spending. These
two important automatic stabilizers remain in
place today, of course, and would provide a
boost should economic activity begin to slow.
Financial reforms. The postwar period has
also benefited from the financial reforms that
were enacted following the 1929 stock market
crash. Although these reforms occurred before
World War II, many of their effects appeared
after the war. In their review of U.S. monetary
history, Friedman and Schwartz observed that
many prewar recessions had been associated with
banking crises. These crises were often precipi-
tated by rumors that a bank would fail. Deposi-
tors acted on these fears and rapidly withdrew
their deposits from the bank. If this withdrawal
of deposits was large enough, the bank would
runoutofreservesandbeforcedtoclose,which
in turn would fuel rumors of failures of other
banks, and the vicious circle would continue.
TheestablishmentoftheFederalDepositInsur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) in 1934 has helped
prevent further banking crises by removing the
incentive of depositors to act upon rumors of
potential bank failures. Other important
reforms, such as the Glass-Steagall Act and the
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Aggregate economic activitySecurities andExchange Actof1934, havealso
helped stabilize financial markets. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Act, for example, was
designedtohelpinforminvestorsandtoprevent
some abuses in financial markets by requiring
corporationsthatissuesecuritiestodisclosecer-
tain information to the public and by restricting
insider trading.
Economic policy activism. Government eco-
nomic policy, both fiscal and monetary, has
becomemoreproactive.SinceWorldWarIIand
the enactment of the Employment Act of 1946,
the economic mandates of the federal govern-
ment and Federal Reserve System have been to
pursue policies consistent with the full employ-
mentofresources.Asaresult,bothfiscalpolicy
and monetary policy have been more active in
their attempts to stabilize the economy, prolong





brakes when inflationary imbalances in the
economy appear to be emerging.
The federal government can pursue these
goalsbyadjustinggovernmentspendingandtax
rates.Forexample,theEconomicRecoveryTax
Act of 1981 and the 1986 Tax Reform Act were
championed as a way to help Americans work,
save, and invest more, which in turn would
encourage sustainable economic growth.
15
Othergovernmentpoliciesnotspecificallycon-




business cycle is subject to a caveat. Although
discretionary fiscal policy has the potential to
stabilize the economy, Zarnowitz and Moore
(1982)havearguedthatthetimingoffiscalpolicy
actionshas,attimes,destabilizedtheeconomy.
The Federal Reserve System can pursue poli-
cies consistent with the full employment of
resources through its control of credit. If eco-
nomic growth is too slow, the Federal Reserve
can stimulate the economy by increasing the
amountofcreditavailabletotheeconomy.Con-
versely, if the economy is growing too rapidly,
the Federal Reserve can slow the economy by
reducing the amount of credit available to the
economy. Monetary policy may have had a
greater stabilizing effect in the postwar period,
in part because of the mandate of the Employ-
ment Act of 1946, but also because during its
early existence the Federal Reserve had limited
tools at its disposal and was unsure of the effect
of the tools it did possess.
17
Structural changes in the economy
Asecond potential explanation for the shift in
the behavior of expansions after World War II
has been structural shifts in the economy. In the
postwar period consumption has shifted toward
less cyclically sensitive components, the com-
position of personal income has shifted toward
morecyclicallystablesources,employmenthas
shifted toward more cyclically stable sectors,
newinventorymanagementtechniqueshavebeen
introduced, the economy has become increas-
inglyglobalized,andconsumersandbusinesses
mayhavebecomemoreconfident intheeconomy.
Shifts in consumption, income, and employ-
ment. Some components of spending are more
cyclically sensitive than other components. On
the consumption side, durable goods consump-
tion is more volatile than nondurable goods and
services consumption. Most durable goods are
highly storable and depreciate slowly. Since
they last a long time, durable goods purchases
can be postponed during economically difficult
times.Asaresult,thedemandfordurablegoods
is highly sensitive to fluctuations in economic
activity.Attheoppositeendofthespectrumare
services. Services, in general, cannot be stored
and, consequently, the demand for services is
relatively stable. Nondurable goods, which
include foodstuffs and clothing as well as other
22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYitems, are typically more storable than services
but their lives are not as long as durable goods.
Consequently,thedemandfornondurablegoodsis
more sensitive than the demand for services but
lesssensitivethanthedemandfordurablegoods.
In the postwar period there has been a large
shift in consumer spending away from nondur-
ablegoodstowardservicesandamodestshiftin
consumer spending away from nondurable
goods toward durable goods. Spending on non-
durable goods represented 56 percent of total
consumer spending, on average, during the
1869-1939 period and 41 percent of total con-
sumer spending during the 1947-97 period.
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Betweenthesetwotimeperiodstheshareoftotal
consumer spending accounted for by services
increased from 35 percent to 46 percent and the
share of total consumer spending accounted for
bydurablegoodsincreasedfrom9percentto13
percent. Hence, on net spending shifted toward
the least cyclically sensitive component of con-
sumption. This shift in spending patterns may





ued to shift toward less sensitive components.
The large shift away from nondurable good
spending toward spending on services has
continued. In addition, there has been a small




nents of consumption, durable goods spending
andnondurablegoodsspending,represented12
percent and 31 percent of total consumer
spending, respectively. This recent shift may
have contributed to a further reduction in the
volatilityofeconomicactivityandalengthening
of expansions.
Some sources of income are more recession
prone than others. Zarnowitz and Moore
(1986b)documentedashiftinsourcesofincome
from those sources that have been more reces-
sion prone to those sources that have been less
recession prone. They showed that the share of
income accounted for by the most recession-
prone sources (private wages and salaries, farm
proprietors income, and nonfarm proprietors
income) has drifted down since 1919. In 1919
these sources accounted for over 73 percent of
total income, but by 1997 these sources
accounted for 52 percent of total income. Over
thissamespantheshareofincomeaccountedfor
by the least recession-prone sources (govern-
mentwagesandsalaries,otherlaborincomeand
transfer payments, dividends, interest, and net
rent)driftedupfrom27percentto48percentof
total income. This shift in the composition of
income by sources appears to have strongly
affected movements in total personal income.
Zarnowitz and Moore (1986b) performed an
experiment which showed that declines in per-






the share of income accounted for by the least
recession-prone sources is still quite high rela-
tivetohistoricalnormsandshouldcontinuetobea
source of stabilization for the economy.
Athird shift that has occurred in the economy
hasbeenashiftinemploymentbetweensectors.
Zarnowitz and Moore (1986b) documented a
shift in employment from cyclically sensitive
sectors to cyclically insensitive sectors. They
showed that the share of nonagricultural
employment accounted for by the economys
four most cyclically sensitive sectors (transpor-
tation,communication,andpublicutilities;min-
ing; construction; and manufacturing) has
declined steadily. These sectors accounted for
57percentoftotalnonagriculturalemployment,
on average, from 1900 to 1939.
21 In the postwar
period, from 1947 to 1997, these sectors
accountedforlessthan40percentoftotalnonag-
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shareofnonagriculturalemploymentaccounted
for by the economys four least cyclical sectors
(finance, insurance, and real estate sector;
wholesale and retail trade; government; and
other services) has increased steadily. From
1900to1939thesesectorsaccountedfor43per-
centoftotalnonagriculturalemployment.Since
1947, these sectors have accounted for over 60
percent of total nonagricultural employment.
22
This trend has continued in the current expan-
sion: since 1990 the least cyclical sectors of the
economy have accounted for 74 percent of total
nonagricultural employment.
A shift in employment from cyclically sensi-
tive sectors to cyclically insensitive sectors, in
principle, could help moderate fluctuations in
economicactivity.However,whilethisexplana-
tion seems reasonable several researchers have
concluded that the shift in employment has
probably had little effect on the volatility of the
businesscycleorthedurationofexpansions.
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Changes in inventory behavior. While inven-
tory investment is only a small part of total
spending, fluctuations in inventories play an
important role in business cycles. Researchers
have shown that inventory investment has been
an important factor in the decline of output dur-
ing prewar and postwar recessions. For exam-
ple,studiesbyAbramowitzandbyBlinderhave
shown that changes in inventory investment
havetypicallyaccountedforbetween50percent
and 70 percent of the peak-to-trough decline in
real GNP during recessions over the 1919-75
period. Over the course of a business cycle
inventoriesmaybeadestabilizinginfluenceand
may help precipitate the ends of expansions. In
the early stages of expansion consumption rises
before output, which leads to inventories being
drawn down. As a result, businesses attempt to
increasetheirinventories.Thisincreasedinvest-
ment in inventories causes a further increase in
income and consumption and, hence, further
increases in inventory investment, output, and
sales. At some point during the expansion the
rate of sales growth slows, resulting in an unin-
tendedbuildupininventories.Whenbusinesses
observethisbuildupofinventories,theycorrect





Recently, improved inventory management
techniques may also have helped stabilize eco-
nomic activity and lengthen economic expan-
sions. Improved inventory management,
throughinnovationssuchastheimplementation
of just-in-time management techniques and
the use of bar codes, allows firms to hold lower
levels of inventories. Consequently, inventory
imbalances are less likely and when they do
occur will tend to be less severe, leading to less
of a need for inventory corrections and helping
to lengthen expansions.
24 Over the last several
years inventory accumulation has been rapid.
Despite this rapid accumulation of inventories,




in the near term.
Increased globalization. While the increased
globalization of the U.S. economy has been an
important postwar change, its effects on the
volatilityofeconomicactivityand,hence,onthe
length of expansions are somewhat ambiguous.
Some aspects of increased globalization can
helpreducevolatilityintheeconomy.Forexam-
ple, as imports have become more important,
spending by businesses and consumers has
become increasingly divided between foreign
and domestic goods. Consequently, reductions
in spending by businesses and consumers have
become increasingly absorbed by imports and
havetendedtoreducethevolatilityofeconomic
activity in the United States. Other aspects of
increased globalization can increase volatility in
24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtheeconomy.Forexample,therecenteconomic
turmoil in Asia and elsewhere in the world has
demonstrated how increased globalization
might increase volatility in the U.S. economy.
Theeconomicturmoilthatbeganinmid-1997
has affected the U.S. economy primarily
throughanincreasedtradedeficit.Devaluations
of the currencies of the countries embroiled in
this turmoil reduced the dollar price of imports
fromthesecountriesandraisedthepriceofU.S.
exports to these countries. As a result, the
demand for imports from these countries has
increased and the demand for U.S. exports has
decreased. The affected countries have also
experienced a substantial reduction in their
growth,whichhasfurtherreducedtheirdemand
for U.S. exports. Consequently, the U.S. trade
deficit has increased, causing growth to slow
substantially. For example, the growth of the
trade deficit subtracted more than two percent-
age points, on average, from overall GDP
growthinthefirsttwoquarterof1998.Overthe
1995-97 period, in contrast, the growing trade
deficitsubtractedonlyone-tenthofapercentage
point, on average, from overall GDP growth.
With the Asian economic spreading to other
countries, the growing trade deficit is likely to
continue to be a drag in the near future.
Shifts in confidence. Afinal structural change
thatmayhaveoccurredinthepostwarperiodhas
been an increased level of confidence in the
economy by consumers and businesses and,
hence, more positive expectations about future
economic conditions. Expectations play an
importantroleintheeconomy.Theeconomycan
continue to operate at a high level in the face of
unfavorable shocks when consumers and busi-
nesses are optimistic about the future prospects
fortheeconomy.Conversely,economicactivity
may slow despite favorable current conditions
whenconsumersandbusinessesarepessimistic
aboutthefuture.Economistscallthisphenome-
non self-fulfilling expectations: if expansions
are expected to be shorter and expansions are
expected to be longer, then they will be. Rela-
tively long expansions since World War II may
have helped reinforce these beliefs.
Confidence in the economy remains strong
today. Two of the most widely publicized mea-
sures of consumer confidence, the Conference
Boards index of consumer confidence and the






the current expansion should not be viewed as
worrisome when examined in the context of all














Although expansions in the postwar period
have been longer and have not tended to die of
old age, it is necessary to recognize that every
expansionisdifferent.Thus,policymakerscan-
not become complacent and will need to con-
tinue to assess whether imbalances have arisen
in the economy and whether shocks have nega-
tively affected the outlook for the economy.
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APPENDIX A
Hazard models are one method that has
beenusedtoanalyzedurationdata.Duration
dataconsistofaseriesofdatapointsthatrep-
resent the time spent in different states. For
example, the last two columns of Table 1
consistofdataonthelengthoftimetheecon-
omy has spent in two states: recession and
expansion.Otherexamplesofdurationdata
used in economic analyses have been the
length of unemployment spells (Lancaster)
and the length of time between transactions
ofastock(EngleandRussell).Durationdata
have also been used extensively outside the
economics field, particularly in the health-
related sciences. An example of such data
would be the time to mortality for heart
transplant patients.
When estimating the hazard model two
characteristics of the data must be dealt
with. First, the data on expansion lengths
that are being used include one observation
that has been censored. That is, there is one
observation whose full length is not yet
known.Thecurrentexpansionhaslasted92
months but is not yet complete. The only
informationwecangleanfromthisobserva-
tion is that the expansion has lasted at least
92 months. Treating this observation as a
completed expansion would be incorrect
and would affect the estimates obtained.
Second,thedataonexpansionlengthsare
truncatedinthesensethatwedonotobserve
any expansions less than a certain length.
For example, suppose an expansion is
definedastwoormoreconsecutivequarters
of real GDP increases; then we would not
seeexpansionslastingonequarterorless.In
this case, the data on expansion lengths
wouldbetruncatedatonequarter.Inreality,
the definition of expansions is much less
precise.Nevertheless,toobtaincorrectesti-
mates,itisnecessarytocontrolforthistrun-
cation of the observed data.
The likelihood function for the hazard
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The parameters to be estimated area and
g. The length of expansion i is given by Iti.
The likelihood function corrects for censored
observations through the dummy variable,
di,whichtakesthevalueof1ifanobserva-
tionisuncensoredand0iftheobservationis
censored. The likelihood function corrects
for the fact that our data are truncated
throughthevariablet0.Inpractice,thetrun-
cation value, t0, has been chosen by using
observed expansion lengths as a guide. The
values of t0 are chosen as the minimum
observed expansion length minus 1 for the
sampleofexpansionsbeingexamined.Over
theentiresampleofexpansionstheshortest
observed expansion has been 10 months,
implyingthatt0=9.Duringtheprewarperi-
od the shortest expansion was also 10
months implying that t0= 9. However, dur-
ing the postwar period the shortest expan-
sion was 12 months,implying that t0=11.ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1998 27
APPENDIX B
Are the results sensitive to alternative
business cycle dates?
Thisappendixexaminesthesensitivityof
the results of this article to alternative busi-
ness cycle dates. It also discusses why the
NBER business cycle chronology may be
flawed and introduces two alternative busi-
ness cycle chronologies. The estimates pre-
sented show that there are only small
differences in the results when alternative
business cycle chronologies are used.
Why consider alternative business
cycle dates?
The average lengths of expansions and
recessionsbeforeandafterWorldWarIIare
vastly different. One explanation for this
difference is that business cycle dynamics
wereverydifferentinthetwoperiods.Asec-
ond explanation for this difference is that
theremaybeaninconsistencyinthewaythe
dates of business cycle peaks and troughs
were determined in the prewar and postwar
periods. For example, the NBER officially
definesarecessionasarecurringperiodof
decline in total output, income, employ-
ment, and trade, usually lasting from six
monthstoayear,andmarkedbywidespread
contractions in many sectors of the econ-
omy.Thisdefinitionconformsverywellto
the postwar business cycle experience, dur-
ing which 8 out of 10 recessions lasted
betweensixmonthsandayear.However,in
theprewarperiodonly3outof21recessions
lasted less than a year.
There are several reasons why there may
beaninconsistencyinthedatingofbusiness
cyclepeaksandtroughsbetweentheprewar
and postwar periods. First, there is a great
deal of difference in the availability of
economic data in the prewar and postwar
period. The availability of monthly and
quarterly data was very limited during the
earlypartoftheNBERbusinesscyclechro-
nology.Inaddition,thedatathatwereavail-
able largely were related to prices rather
than production or employment. Second,
the NBER focused on detrended data when
determining business cycle turning points
priorto1927buthasuseddatawiththetrend
stillinittodeterminebusinesscycleturning
points since then. Finally, there are differ-
ences in the way early and modern NBER
researchers treated extreme values in the
individual series examined.
Alternative business cycle dates
Becauseoftheseapparentinconsistenciesin
the NBERs business cycle dating methodol-
ogy, several researchers have compiled alter-
native sets of business cycle dates. Romer




set of business cycle turning point dates. He
examinedwhethersystematicdifferencesin
the volatility of the series used to date prewar
and postwar business cycle turning points
are important by creating an alternative set
of postwar business cycle turning point
datesusingonlythoseserieswhichhadbeen
used to date the prewar recessions.
26
Thealternativesetsofbusinesscycleturn-
ing point dates developed by Romer and by
Watson appear in Table B1. The Romer set28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX B - continued
Table B1
ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS CYCLE CHRONOLOGY FOR THE U.S.
Romer chronology Watson chronology
Trough Peak Trough Peak
  Dec. 1854 Jun. 1857
  Dec. 1858 Oct. 1860
  Jun. 1861 Apr. 1865
  Dec. 1867 Jun. 1869
  Dec. 1870 Oct. 1873
  Mar. 1879 Mar. 1882
 Feb. 1887 May 1885 Mar. 1887
Jul. 1887  Apr. 1888 Jul. 1890
 Jan. 1893 May 1891 Jan. 1893
Feb. 1894 Dec. 1895 Jun. 1894 Dec. 1895
Jan. 1897 Apr. 1900 Jun. 1897 Jun. 1899
Dec. 1900 Jul. 1903 Dec. 1900 Sep. 1902
Mar. 1904 Jul. 1907 Aug. 1904 May 1907
Jun. 1908 Jan. 1910 Jun. 1908 Jan. 1910
May 1911 Jun. 1914 Jan. 1912 Jan. 1913
Nov. 1914 May 1916 Dec. 1914 Aug. 1918
Jan. 1917 Jul. 1918
Mar. 1919 Jan. 1920 Mar. 1919 Jan. 1920
Jul. 1921 May 1923 Jul. 1921 May 1923
Jul. 1924 Mar. 1927 Jul. 1924 Oct. 1926
Dec. 1927 Sep. 1929 Nov. 1928 Aug. 1929
Jul. 1932 Aug. 1937 Mar. 1933 May 1937
Jun. 1938 Dec. 1939 Jun. 1938 
Mar. 1940   Feb. 1945
 Oct. 1948 Oct. 1945 Aug. 1948
Oct. 1949  Oct. 1949 Apr. 1951
 Aug. 1953 Jan. 1952 Jul. 1953
Aug. 1954 Aug. 1957 Feb. 1954 Jun. 1956
Apr. 1958 May 1960 Apr. 1958 Nov. 1959
Feb. 1961  Sep. 1961 Oct. 1966
 Oct. 1969 Jun. 1967 Nov. 1969
Nov. 1970 Nov. 1973 Jan. 1971 Oct. 1973
Jul. 1975 Mar. 1980 May 1975 Sep. 1978
Jul. 1980 Jul. 1981 Jan. 1980 Apr. 1981
Apr. 1983  Dec. 1982 Apr. 1984
 Jul. 1990 Jan. 1986 Jun. 1989
Sources:TheRomerchronologyofbusinesscycledateswasobtainedfromRomer(1994). TheWatsonchronology
of business cycle dates was obtained from Watson (1994).ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1998 29
extends only as far back as 1887 because of
limitations on the availability of industrial
production data prior to that year. The post-
warRomerchronologyisquitesimilartothe
actual NBER chronology but the prewar
chronologies differ markedly. There is one
cycle that the NBER identified that was not
identifiedbyRomerandtherearetwocycles
identifiedbyRomerthathadnotbeenidenti-
fied by the NBER. In addition, the turning
point dates for the cycles identified by both
Romer and the NBER differ substantially.
The Watson chronology takes the NBER
prewar business cycle chronology as given
and, hence, his business cycle chronology
extends back to 1854. Since World War II
Watsonhasidentifiedthreecycleswhichthe
NBER had not identified. Also, the turning
point dates for the cycles identified by both
Watson and the NBER sometimes differ
substantially.
APPENDIX B - continued
Table B2


































Table 1 and the Romer business cycle chronology presented in Table B1. The entire sample for the Romer chronology
consists of all Romer expansions between 1887 and 1990 excluding the wartime March 1940-October 1948 expansion
identified by Romer. The entire sample for the NBER chronology consists of all NBER expansions between 1887 and
1990excludingthewartimeJune1938-February1945expansion. TheprewarsamplefortheRomerchronologyconsists
of the 15 expansions that Romer identified as occurring between 1887 and 1939. The prewar sample for the NBER
chronology consists of the 14 expansions that the NBER identified as occurring between 1887 and 1938. The postwar
samplefortheRomerchronologyconsistsofthe8expansionsthatRomerhasidentifiedasoccurringbetween1945and
1990. The postwar sample for the NBER chronology consists of the 9 expansions that the NBER has identified as
occurring between 1945 and 1990.30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY




business cycle chronologies for the
1887-1990 period appear in Table B2. As
shown in the bottom half of the table, using
theNBERbusinesscyclechronologyforthe
restricted 1887-1940 period slightly alters
oneimportantresultfromtheanalysisofthe
prewar period presented in the main text of




ever, as shown in the top half of the table,
usingtheRomerbusinesscyclechronology
instead of the NBER business cycle chro-
Table B3


































Calculations are based on the NBER business cycle chronology presented in Table 1 and the Watson business cycle
chronologypresentedinTableB1. TheentiresamplefortheWatsonandNBERbusinesscyclechronologiesconsistsofall
expansionsthatoccurredbetween1854and1990excludingthewartimeJune1938-February1945expansion. Theprewar
samples for both the Watson and NBER business cycle chronologies consist of the 21 expansions that occurred between
1854and1938. ThepostwarsamplefortheWatsonchronologyconsistsofthe12expansionsthatWatsonhasidentifiedas
occurring between 1945 and 1990. The postwar sample for the NBER chronology consists of the 9 expansions that the
NBER has identified as occurring between 1945 and 1990.
APPENDIX B - continuedENDNOTES
1 Economists have used a variety of techniques to
analyze the probability of an expansion ending. Diebold
andRudebusch(1987,1991)andWatson(1994)haveused
nonparametric methods to examine the length of business
cycle phases. Sichel (1991) and Diebold, Rudebusch, and
Sichelhaveusedparametricmethods,liketheonesusedin
this article, to examine whether the probability of an
expansion ending depends on the length of the expansion.
Other researchers, such as Stock and Watson and Filardo
and Gordon, have used leading indicators to model the
probability of recessions. Huh (1991) and Watson (1991)
providedanintroductiontoseveralofthesemethodologies.
2Theguidingprinciplesusedtodefinebusinesscycles
were laid out in the mid-1940s. Arthur Burns and Wesley
Mitchelldefinedbusinesscyclesasatypeoffluctuation
found in the aggregate economic activity of nations that
organizetheirworkmainlyinbusinessenterprises:acycle
consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in
many economic activities, followed by similarly general
recessions,contractionsandrevivalswhichmergeintothe
expansionphaseofthenextcycle;thissequenceofchanges
is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles
vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years; they
arenotdivisibleintoshortercyclesofsimilarcharacterwith
amplitudes approximating their own (1946, p. 3).
3TheBurnsandMitchelldefinitionofbusinesscycles
might be interpreted as suggesting that the business cycle
consists of more than two phases. Some researchers,
including Shultze; Eckstein and Sinai; and Sichel (1994)
have identified three stages of the business cycle:
recession, recovery, and expansion. As in the standard
definition, a recession is a period during which aggregate
economic activity declines. The recovery stage of the
business cycle is defined as a high-growth period that
followstherecessionstageandboostsaggregateeconomic
activity back to its prerecession level. The third stage, the
expansion, is a slower growth period during which
aggregateeconomicactivityexceedsitsprerecessionlevel.
4 The NBER is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan
research organization dedicated to promoting a greater
understanding of how the economy works.
5 This definition, as well as other information on U.S.
business cycles, is available at http://www.nber.org/
cycles.html.Althoughacommondefinitionofrecessionis
atleasttwoconsecutivequartersofdeclineinrealGNP,the
NBER makes clear that this is not how they define a
recession. Zarnowitz and Moore (1986a) have pointed out
two drawbacks to this rule-of-thumb. First, even though
GNP is a very comprehensive indicator it is only able to
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nology for the 1887-1990, 1887-1940, and
1949-40 periods does not alter any of the





business cycle chronologies for the
1854-1990 period appear in Table B3. The
prewar results for the NBER and Watson
chronologies were identical since Watson
tooktheprewarNBERbusinesscyclechro-
nologyasgiven.UsingtheWatsonbusiness
cycle chronology did alter one conclusion
obtained using the NBER business cycle
chronology. Expansions over the entire
Watsonchronologyappearedmorelikelyto
endastheygotolder.However,thekeycon-
clusion from this article was unchanged
whentheWatsonbusinesscyclechronology
was used instead of the NBER business
cycle chronology. The behavior of expan-
sions in the postwar period was different
than that of expansion in the prewar period.
Postwar expansions have demonstrated no
significant tendency to die of old age.
APPENDIX B - continuedmeasure some aspects of aggregate economic activity.
Second, because all economic series contain some
measurement error it is better to identify business cycles
based on the weight of evidence from a consensus of
indicatorsratherthanasingleindicator.Otherresearchers,
including Zarnowitz and Moore (1986b), McNees, and
Watson (1991), have pointed out that recession dates
obtained using this rule-of-thumb do not correspond to
official recession dates very well.
6 Although it may be widely agreed that a business cycle
phase has ended the dating of the turning point does not
occurimmediatelyupontheendofabusinesscyclephase.
The Committee last met in December 1992 when they
determinedthatatroughhadbeenreachedinMarch1991.
Forthelastsixturningpoints,ithastakenanaverageoften
months between the date of a turning point and the date it
was announced.
7 The prewar subsample consists of business cycle phases
that were completed prior to the end of 1945. The postwar
subsample consists of business cycle phases that were
completed after 1945.
8 For an excellent introduction to hazard models, see
Kiefer.
9 Although this article deals with expansions the hazard
modelsusedinthisanalysiscouldalsobeappliedtodataon
recessions. Copies of this analysis of recession lengths are





11 Many economists, such as DeLong and Summers, have
arguedthattherehasbeenasignificantdeclineinthesizeof
economic fluctuations between the prewar and postwar
periods. Others, such as Romer (1986), have argued that
therewasnoincreaseinthestabilityoftheU.S.economyin
the prewar period. Any evidence of increased stability,
Romer argued, was due to flawed prewar data. However,
O’Brien demonstrated that Romer’s results were sensitive
to the choice of data series that were compared, the choice
of detrending method, and the time periods compared.
12 The two example economies differ only with respect to
the amplitude of the fluctuations around the long-run
growth path. The long-run growth paths in each of these
two example economies are identical. In addition, the
periodicitiesofthefluctuationsaroundthelong-rungrowth
pathineachofthesetwoexampleeconomiesarethesame.
13 Data for the 1869-1916 period were obtained from the
U.S. Department of Commerce (1975). Data for the
1919-39 period were obtained from Balke and Gordon.
Data for the 1947-97 period were obtained from the U.S.
Department of Commerce (1998).
14 Although automatic stabilizers are items in the
government’s budget, they are not part of discretionary
fiscal policy. Discretionary fiscal policy involves the
government enacting changes in the government budget.
15 For a given level of volatility of economic activity, an
increase in growth would lead to longer expansions and
shorterrecessions.Expansionsinaneconomywithahigher
long-run rate of growth are longer than expansions with a
lower long-run rate of growth because higher long-run
growthtendstodominatefluctuationsaroundthelong-run
growth path more than lower long-run growth.
16Forexample,theVeteran’sBenefitsActof1944(GIBill)
has helped to promote economic growth and, hence,
lengthen expansions through the development of human
capital.
17AlthoughtheFederalReserveSystemwasestablishedin
1914, its mandate and the tools it had available to it were
limited during the earliest years of its existence. For
example, the Federal Reserve did not have the power to
change reserve requirements and its open market
operations were limited because Reserve Banks did not
havesecuritiestheycouldsell.Openmarketoperationsdid
not become the dominant monetary policy tool until after
WorldWarII.Inaddition,duringtheprewarperiodtherole
of the Federal Reserve System was still being debated and
the Federal Reserve was still learning about the effects of
themonetarypolicytoolstheyhadattheirdisposal.Foran
excellent discussion of the history of the Federal Reserve
System and the conduct of monetary policy, see
Meulendyke.
18 These percentages are based on nominal spending data
from two sources. Data for the 1869-1931 period were
obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975)
andtherestofthedatawereobtainedfromU.S.Department
of Commerce (1998).
19 This net shift in spending toward the most cyclically
sensitive component of consumption does not necessarily
translate into a reduction in the cyclical sensitivity of
overall consumer spending. Since spending is shifting
away from nondurable goods toward the more sensitive
durable goods component and the less sensitive services
component, the impact of this shift on the sensitivity of
overall consumer spending would depend on the
sensitivitiesofspendingondurablegoodsandspendingon
services relative to the sensitivity of spending on
nondurable goods. For example, if spending on durable
32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYgoods was significantly more cyclically sensitive than
spending on nondurable goods and spending on services
was only slightly less cyclically sensitive than consumer
spending, on net, shifted toward services the cyclical
spending of overall consumer spending might increase.
20 In their experiment Zarnowitz and Moore created a
pseudo history of declines in personal income during
recessionsbyweightingtheactualdeclinesinthesourcesof
personal income by their 1948 shares of total personal
income.Usingthispseudohistorytheyfoundthatpersonal
income would have declined 2.3 percent on average over
the seven recessions from 1948 to 1980 compared with an
actual1.1percentaveragedeclineduringtheserecessions.
21 These cyclically sensitive sectors also accounted for a
large share of employment prior to 1900. For example,
Kendrickreportedthatin1869thesesectorsaccountedfor
almost 59 percent of total nonagricultural employment.
22 Caves observed a qualitatively similar, though not as
sharp,trendinthedistributionofincomeamongtheseeight
sectors.
23 Watson (1994) and Filardo (1997) have both
investigated this relationship. Watson (1994) examined
whether the employment shift from cyclically sensitive
sectors to cyclically insensitive sectors has led to an




the first experiment Watson created a pseudo prewar
history of sectoral employment by using prewar trend
components of sectoral employment and postwar cyclical
components of sectoral employment. He found that the
trend components of sectoral employment explained the
apparentdifferenceinprewarandpostwarphasedurations.
In the second experiment he created a pseudo prewar and
postwar history of sectoral employment using a dynamic
factor model. He found that implausibly large covariance
amongemploymentinvarioussectorswouldbenecessary
to explain average prewar phase durations.
Filardo (1997) investigated whether the declining
manufacturingshareinemploymentsince1960hasledtoa
less volatile business cycle and longer expansions. He
found no evidence of such a relationship.
24 The effect of improved inventory management
techniquesismostlikelytohavebeennoticedinthelasttwo
decades. However, Filardo (1995) and Allen showed that
the effect of these changes in inventory management
techniques on economic activity has, to date, been
negligible. Nevertheless, Allen concluded by suggesting
that,inthelongruntheinventorymanagementinnovations
can reduce the boom-bust cycle in the economy.
25 This is a loss-based algorithm that incorporates the
notion that recessions must be of significant duration and
amplitude.
26HeusedthealgorithmdevelopedbyBryandBoschanto
find peaks and troughs for seven series and then
judgmentally based his business cycle turning point dates
based on the turning point dates for the specific series.
27Thedifferencebetweentheprewarperiodresultsforthe
1887-1940 sample presented in Table B2 and the
1854-1940 period presented in Table 3 is very small.
Although a is not significantly greater than 1 at the 5
percent significance level, it is significantly greater than 1
at the 6 percent significance level.
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